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 OPINION  
 _______________ 
 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 





JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Robert King, Jr. (“King”) appeals an order of the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment for defendant Rocktenn, 
CP LLC (“Rocktenn”). We will affirm.  
I.  Background1  
In the early morning of January 28, 2011, King slipped and fell while working at 
9820 Blue Grass Road in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (the “premises”), a truck yard 
owned by Rocktenn.  At that time, King was working for Lily Transportation as a “yard 
jockey,” responsible for hooking trailers to tractors, and unhooking them, and moving 
them in and out of loading docks.  Throughout his tenure at Lily Transportation, King 
worked exclusively at the premises.  At all relevant times, he was there as a business 
invitee.   
Shortly before the accident, on January 26, 2011, a foot of snow fell in 
Philadelphia.  On the afternoon of January 27, King began his shift and was scheduled to 
work overnight until 6:00 a.m. on the 28th.  Upon arriving, he inspected the yard and 
found it had been plowed but that there was still some snow and ice, including between 
some of the trailers.  King did not, however, see any of it around the area between trailers 
five and six.  He concluded that the premises were “safe enough for [him] to do [his] 
                                              
1 Because this case was resolved on summary judgment, we view the facts in the 
light most favorable to King, the non-moving party.  Howley v. Mellon Fin. Corp., 625 





job.”  (A129.)  Sometime before 6:00 a.m., King was tasked with moving the trailer 
positioned at door six of the loading dock, which required him to hook that trailer onto a 
tractor.  To do so, King had to pass between trailers five and six for the first time that 
shift.  As he passed, King had his hand on a “hold bar” for stability, but slipped and 
landed on his backside.  (A130-34.)  In the course of his fall, he shifted all his weight 
onto the arm he was using to grasp the “hold bar,” thus injuring his shoulder.  (Id.)  King 
completed his shift, including some overtime, and then sought medical attention.    
Although initially diagnosed as a sprain, King’s injury was ultimately determined to be 
more serious, and he had surgery on his shoulder to correct it.    
In January 2012, King filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 
County against Rocktenn and a number of other defendants alleging, inter alia, 
negligence in permitting dangerous conditions to persist on the premises.2  He later 
amended his complaint, naming only Rocktenn as a defendant but maintaining a similar 
theory of liability.  Rocktenn removed the case to federal court in November 2013.  
Following discovery, Rocktenn moved for summary judgment, and the District Court 
granted that motion.   
This timely appeal followed.  
                                              
2 The complaint also included a loss of consortium claim by Mrs. King. That claim 
was also present in the amended complaint and is at issue in this appeal.  
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II.  Discussion3 
 We exercise plenary review over a District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  
Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015).  “Our review is identical to the 
review performed by the district court.”  Id.  “Summary judgment is proper if there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Smathers v. Multi-Tool, Inc./Multi-Plastics, Inc. Employee Health & Welfare Plan, 298 
F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 2002). 
As our jurisdiction in this case is based on diversity of citizenship, our review 
applies the substantive law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  Sheridan v. NGK 
Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 253 (3d Cir. 2010)  In Pennsylvania, according to the case of 
Carrender v. Fitterer, “[t]he standard of care a possessor of land owes to one who enters 
upon the land depends upon whether the person entering is a trespassor, licensee, or 
invitee.”  469 A.2d 120, 123 (Pa. 1983).  It is undisputed that King was a business invitee 
at the time of the incident.  “A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm 
caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the 
exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition and should realize that it 
involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they 
will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) 
fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.”  Atkins v. Urban 
                                              
 3 The District Court had jurisdiction in this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).  




Redevelopment Auth. of Pittsburgh, 414 A.2d 100, 103-04 (Pa. 1980) (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965)).   
Against the backdrop of this liability, however, is the rule that “‘[a] possessor of 
land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to them by any activity or 
condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them … .’” Carrender, 469 
A.2d at 123 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965)).  This test is 
disjunctive.  “For a danger to be ‘known,’ it must ‘not only be known to exist, but ... also 
be recognized that it is dangerous and the probability and gravity of the threatened harm 
must be appreciated.’”  Id. at 124.  “A danger is deemed to be ‘obvious’ when ‘both the 
condition and the risk are apparent to and would be recognized by a reasonable man, in 
the position of the visitor, exercising normal perception, intelligence, and judgment.’”  Id. 
at 123; see also Atkins, 414 A.2d at 104 (“[T]he law of Pennsylvania does not impose 
liability if it is reasonable for the possessor to believe that the dangerous condition would 
be obvious to and discovered by his invitee.”).  
Here, King seizes on the District Court’s reliance on Carrender to draw what he 
avers is a critical distinction – that the plaintiff in that case, unlike King himself, had 
actual knowledge of the icy conditions at the specific location where she fell.  Because 
King did not have knowledge of ice in the exact location where he fell, he argues that he 
could not have assumed the risk of a fall and injury.  That position, however, ignores both 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding what constitutes “knowledge” 
and the disjunctive nature of the “known or obvious” test.   
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 In Atkins v. Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh, a plaintiff, while 
inspecting a house slated for demolition, fell down a set of stairs due to a missing second 
stair.  414 A.2d at 102.  He testified at trial that he did not know the second stair was 
missing, yet the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found no duty on the part of the property 
owner, and thus no liability.  Id. at 354.  It reasoned that, because the inspectors knew the 
house was slated to be demolished, it was reasonable for the property owner to rely on 
the inspectors entering the property “to take care in performing required services” and “to 
discover hazards and to take steps to protect themselves.”  Id. at 353-54.   
King’s situation is analogous.  Having awareness of the general danger – that there 
was ice and snow throughout the yard, and between some of the trailers specifically – the 
property owner could reasonably rely on King and the other yard jockeys to act carefully, 
discover hazards, and take the appropriate steps to protect themselves from the danger 
inherent in those the conditions.  Indeed, King testified that it was part of his 
responsibility to inspect the yard at the beginning of his shift, and that a procedure was in 
place whereby he could report ice or other unsafe conditions he discovered and have 
them rectified.  King made no such requests.  He said that “it looked like a regular, safe 
day to do [his] job.”4  (A130.)   
In addition to his knowledge of the conditions that day, King testified that he had 
worked on the premises following snow storms in the past and confirmed that “on most 
occasions [in the area] between the trailers there would still be snow and ice.”  (A151.)  
                                              
4  If that was his perception, it is remarkable, because a foot of snow is not on the 
ground on a regular day in Philadelphia. 
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In fact, King proffered as evidence a video, taken on the premises a few days following 
the incident, which clearly shows patches of ice and snow remained between the trailers.  
He confirmed that the conditions in the video were consistent with those the day of the 
incident.        
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court made clear in Atkins that highly specific 
knowledge of the danger faced is not necessary to a finding that a plaintiff has assumed 
the risk associated with certain working conditions.  Nothing in that case suggested that 
the plaintiff had specific knowledge that the second stair was missing (and therefore 
dangerous), or even knowledge that dilapidated stairs were a particular risk on the 
property.  Here, King had equal if not greater knowledge regarding the specific risk he 
faced, as shown by his testimony that he was aware of the presence of ice and snow on 
the premises, including between the trailers.  In light of Atkins, that is sufficient to 
constitute a “known” danger under Pennsylvania law, and it is of no consequence that 
King did not know there was a patch of ice in the specific location where he slipped.   
Even if King’s knowledge of the conditions were not sufficiently specific to make 
the risk “known,” the record shows that it was certainly “obvious.”  King’s testimony 
confirmed that “on most occasions” following snow storms, “between the trailers there 
would still be snow and ice,” (A151) and that  “anybody working [on the day of the 
incident] should have known there was snow and ice between those trailers,” (A 147).  
That testimony, corroborated by his supervisor, and his coworker, leaves no real doubt 
that “the condition and the risk [were] apparent to and would be recognized by a 
reasonable man … exercising normal perception, intelligence, and judgment.”  
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Carrender, 469 A.2d  at 124 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Faced with such 
conditions, and the inherent danger of slipping presented by snow and ice, no reasonable 
man could have failed to recognize the risk presented.  The risk of a fall was obvious, and 
King assumed that risk.  
The District Court was thus correct in determining that reasonable minds could not 
differ in concluding that the danger presented by the snow and ice between trailers was 
“known or obvious,” and the Court properly granted Rocktenn’s motion for summary 
judgment.5   
III.  Conclusion 
 For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm.  
                                              
5 Because Doris King’s loss of consortium claim is predicated on the negligence 
claim, its dismissal was also proper.  See Craig v. Franklin Mills Assoc., L.P., 555 
F.Supp2d 547, 555 (E.D.Pa. 2008) aff’d sub nom., 350 Fed. Appx. 714 (3d Cir. 2009) (“If 
the underlying negligence claim brought by the claimant’s spouse is dismissed … the loss 
of consortium claim must also be dismissed.”).  
